The Ambiguous Role of Experience in Cartesian Science

Abstract
Descartes' methodology is ambiguous about the role of empirical evidence in science. This ambiguity does not derive from Rationalist qualms about the specifically empirical character of such evidence; for the apparant clash of experience and reason is explained by the need to re-interpret perceptions in terms of new theories, and by the frequently "contaminated" status of so-called experimental evidence. The ambiguity results, rather, from: (a) Descartes' predilection for "ordinary experience" rather than experiments as a source of warrant, and (b) the looseness of fit between hypotheses and confirming evidence. The mathematical ideal of science is a camouflage for a naive, and conceptually impoverished, empiricism.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories No categories specified
(categorize this paper)
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
 
Download options
PhilPapers Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 9,351
External links
  • Through your library Configure
    References found in this work BETA

    No references found.

    Citations of this work BETA

    No citations found.

    Similar books and articles
    Steven Gimbel (2004). Restoring Ambiguity to Achinstein's Account of Evidence. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 55 (2):269-285.
    Louis Caruana (2009). The Force of Counter-Evidence in Science and Religion. International Philosophical Quarterly 49 (3):361-374.
    Michael Devitt (2006). Intuitions in Linguistics. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 57 (3):481-513.
    Gregor Schiemann (2007). Contexts of Nature According to Aristotle and Descartes. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy 5:65-71.
    Analytics

    Monthly downloads

    Added to index

    2011-05-29

    Total downloads

    2 ( #258,148 of 1,088,389 )

    Recent downloads (6 months)

    1 ( #69,601 of 1,088,389 )

    How can I increase my downloads?

    My notes
    Sign in to use this feature


    Discussion
    Start a new thread
    Order:
    There  are no threads in this forum
    Nothing in this forum yet.