David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Cognitive Science 21 (4):461-481 (1997)
Recent studies such as Thelen and Smith (1994), Kelso (1995), Van Gelder (1995), Beer (1995), and others have presented a forceful case for a dynamical systems approach to understanding cognition and adaptive behavior. These studies call into question some foundational assumptions concerning the nature of cognitive scientific explanation and (in particular) the role of notions such as internal representation and computation. These are exciting and important challenges. But they must be handled with care. It is all to easy in this debate to lose sight of the explanatorily important issues and to talk at cross purposes, courtesy of the (suprisingly) various ways in which different theorists often concieve key terms.
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References found in this work BETA
Jerry A. Fodor (1987). Psychosemantics: The Problem of Meaning in the Philosophy of Mind. MIT Press.
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Jerry A. Fodor (1975). The Language of Thought. Harvard University Press.
Francisco Varela, Evan Thompson & Eleanor Rosch (1991). The Embodied Mind: Cognitive Science and Human Experience. MIT Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Andy Clark (2009). Spreading the Joy? Why the Machinery of Consciousness is (Probably) Still in the Head. Mind 118 (472):963-993.
Andy Clark (1999). An Embodied Cognitive Science? Trends in Cognitive Sciences 3 (9):345-351.
Randall D. Beer (2000). Dynamical Approaches to Cognitive Science. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 4 (3):91-99.
William P. Bechtel (1998). Representations and Cognitive Explanations: Assessing the Dynamicist Challenge in Cognitive Science. Cognitive Science 22 (3):295-317.
Marco Mirolli (2012). Representations in Dynamical Embodied Agents: Re-Analyzing a Minimally Cognitive Model Agent. Cognitive Science 36 (5):870-895.
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