David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Journal of Consciousness Studies 10 (12):35-37 (2003)
When I first open a new document on my computer, as I have just done, the relationship between my key presses and what happens on the screen is rather loose. I press Enter a few times to move the cursor down the page a bit , and sometimes nothing happens for a while; or the cursor disappears for a few seconds before reappearing in its new position. After a minute or so, the machine seems to settle down, and then the correlation between taps on the keyboard and movements on the screen becomes much tighter and more consistent. Then, because taps and movements are tightly and predictably coupled, it hardly seems an inference at all to see the taps as the causes of the changes on the screen. While the computer is still 'waking up', I imagine that the taps are still the causes of the screen changes, but that the temporal relationship is lengthened and muddied by the fact that there is a lot else going on inside the machine while it is, so to speak, finishing dressing and cleaning its teeth. If, however, the machine was not just sleepy and preoccupied but seriously ill, then the relationship between taps and screen changes might become so bizarre and inconsistent that I would assume that causality had broken down. There may be causal connections inside still — the machine may still be operating in a completely deterministic fashion — but as I can no longer make sense of the relationship between input and output, I withdraw the imputation of causality
|Keywords||Body Consciousness Dualism Metaphysics Mind|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Lynne Rudder Baker (1995). Need a Christian Be a Mind/Body Dualist' ? Faith and Philosophy 12 (4):489-504.
Colin McGinn (1989). Can We Solve the Mind-Body Problem? Mind 98 (July):349-66.
Rocco J. Gennaro (1996). Mind and Brain: A Dialogue on the Mind-Body Problem. Indianapolis: Hackett.
Colin McGinn (2004). Consciousness and its Objects. Oxford University Press University Press.
Michael Tye (2006). Absent Qualia and the Mind-Body Problem. Philosophical Review 115 (2):139-168.
Giuseppina D'Oro (2005). Collingwood's Solution to the Problem of Mind-Body Dualism. Philosophia 32 (1-4):349-368.
Alex Byrne (2006). Color and the Mind-Body Problem. Dialectica 60 (2):223-44.
Dean W. Zimmerman (2004). Should a Christian Be a Mind-Body Dualist?: Christians Should Affirm Mind-Body Dualism. In Michael L. Peterson & Raymond J. VanArragon (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Religion. Malden MA: Blackwell Publishing.
Benny Shanon (2008). Mind-Body, Body-Mind: Two Distinct Problems. Philosophical Psychology 21 (5):697 – 701.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads141 ( #7,618 of 1,410,090 )
Recent downloads (6 months)19 ( #11,785 of 1,410,090 )
How can I increase my downloads?