True theories, false colors

Philosophy of Science (Supplement) 63 (3):143-50 (1996)
University of Connecticut Storrs, CT 06279-2054. Recent versions of objectivism can reply to the argument from metamers. The deeper rift between subjectivists and objectivists lies in the question of how to explain the structure of qualitative similarities among the colors. Subjectivism grounded in this fashion can answer the circularity objection raised by Dedrick. It endorses skepticism about the claim that there is some one property of objects that it is the function of color vision to detect. Color vision may enable us to detect differences in spectral composition without granting us the capacity to detect identities
Keywords Color  Objectivism  Scepticism  Science  Truth  Vision  Dedrick, D  Hall, R
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DOI 10.1086/289946
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A. Revonsuo (1998). Troubles with Bubbles? Consciousness and Cognition 7 (2):206-209.

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