|Abstract||Recent work in Cognitive Science highlights the importance of exemplar-based know-how in supporting human expertise. Influenced by this model, many accounts of moral knowledge now stress exemplar-based, non-sentential know-how at the expense of the rule-and-principle based accounts favored by Kant, Mill and others. I shall argue, however, that moral thought and reason is an intrinsically complex achievement that cannot be understood by reference to either of these roles alone. Moral cognition -- like other forms of ‘advanced’ cognition -- depends on the subtle interplay and interaction between multiple factors and forces and especially (or so I argue) between the use of linguistic tools and formulations and more biologically basic forms of thought and reason.|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Through your library||Only published papers are available at libraries|
Similar books and articles
Jillian Craigie (2011). Thinking and Feeling: Moral Deliberation in a Dual-Process Framework. Philosophical Psychology 24 (1):53-71.
Pamela Christine Lyon, Autopoiesis and Knowing: Reflections on Maturana's Biogenic Explaination of Cognition.
John M. Mikhail (2011). Elements of Moral Cognition: Rawls' Linguistic Analogy and the Cognitive Science of Moral and Legal Judgment. Cambridge University Press.
Mason Cash (2010). Extended Cognition, Personal Responsibility, and Relational Autonomy. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 9 (4):645-671.
Wayne Christensen & John Sutton, Reflections on Emotions, Imagination, and Moral Reasoning Toward an Integrated, Multidisciplinary Approach to Moral Cognition.
Kim Sterelny (2010). Moral Nativism: A Sceptical Response. Mind and Language 25 (3):279-297.
Patrick Kain (2010). Practical Cognition, Intuition, and the Fact of Reason. In Benjamin Lipscomb & James Krueger (eds.), Kant's Moral Metaphysics: God, Freedom, and Immortality. de Gruyter.
Damian Cox (2006). Agent-Based Theories of Right Action. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 9 (5):505 - 515.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads56 ( #17,866 of 551,105 )
Recent downloads (6 months)4 ( #19,303 of 551,105 )
How can I increase my downloads?