Graduate studies at Western
Dialogue 18 (01):64-72 (1979)
|Abstract||In her recent paper, “Belief, Values and the Will,” Trudy Govier raises several interesting and challenging points. Most interesting is her conclusion that it is at least logically possible for a person to believe something “simply in virtue of having taken that decision,” i.e., by fiat. In otherwords, it is possible to believe something by an act of will.|
|Keywords||will to believe epistemology|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Raul Hakli (2007). On the Possibility of Group Knowledge Without Belief. Social Epistemology 21 (3):249 – 266.
Hamid Vahid (2009). The Epistemology of Belief. Palgrave Macmillan.
Christoph Kelp (2011). In Defence of Virtue Epistemology. Synthese 179 (3):409-33.
Franz Huber, Formal Representations of Belief. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
J. Adam Carter, Benjamin Jarvis & Katherine Rubin (forthcoming). Knowledge and the Value of Cognitive Ability. Synthese.
Alan Hájek & Stephan Hartmann (2010). Bayesian Epistemology. In J. Dancy et al (ed.), A Companion to Epistemology. Blackwell.
B. Ball (2013). Knowledge is Normal Belief. Analysis 73 (1):69-76.
Patrick Hawley (2007). Skepticism and the Value of Knowledge. In Chienkuo Mi Ruey-lin Chen (ed.), Naturalized Epistemology and Philosophy of Science.
William P. Alston (1983). What's Wrong with Immediate Knowledge? Synthese 55 (April):73-96.
A. Morton (2000). Saving Epistemology From the Epistemologists: Recent Work in the Theory of Knowledge. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 51 (4):685-704.
Margherita di Stasio (2006). On Plantinga's Idea of Warrant in Epistemology and in Philosophy of Religion. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 6 (2):307-325.
John Peterson (1996). True Belief and Knowledge Revisited. Grazer Philosophische Studien 52:127-135.
Matthias Steup, Epistemology. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Sorry, there are not enough data points to plot this chart.
Added to index2010-09-25
Total downloads1 ( #294,156 of 751,988 )
Recent downloads (6 months)0
How can I increase my downloads?