David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 58 (3):563 - 594 (2007)
What is the role of conscious visual experience in the control and guidance of human behaviour? According to some recent treatments, the role is surprisingly indirect. Conscious visual experience, on these accounts, serves the formation of plans and the selection of action types and targets, while the control of 'online' visually guided action proceeds via a quasi-independent non-conscious route. In response to such claims, critics such as (Wallhagen , pp. 539-61) have suggested that the notions of control and guidance invoked are unacceptably vague, and that that the image of 'zombie systems' guiding action fails to take account of the possibility that there is genuine but unconceptualized, unnoticed, and/or unreportable experience taking place and guiding or controlling the actions. I address both sets of concerns. I try to show that refining and clarifying the key notions of control and guidance leaves the original argument intact, as does the appeal to unconceptualized, unnoticed, or unreportable experiences. The exercise serves, however, to highlight an important complex of considerations concerning the relations between control, agency, and experience. Better understanding these relations is, I suggest, an important source of insights concerning the nature of phenomenal experience
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Robert Briscoe (2009). Egocentric Spatial Representation in Action and Perception. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (2):423 - 460.
Dustin Stokes (2009). Aesthetics and Cognitive Science. Philosophy Compass 4 (5):715-733.
Berit Brogaard (2011). Conscious Vision for Action Versus Unconscious Vision for Action? Cognitive Science 35 (6):1076-1104.
Dave Ward, Tom Roberts & Andy Clark (2011). Knowing What We Can Do: Actions, Intentions, and the Construction of Phenomenal Experience. Synthese 181 (3):375-394.
Christopher Mole (2009). Illusions, Demonstratives and the Zombie Action Hypothesis. Mind 118 (472):995-1011.
Similar books and articles
John Dilworth (2008). Free Action as Two Level Voluntary Control. Philosophical Frontiers 3 (1):29-45.
Jesús H. Aguilar & Andrei A. Buckareff (2009). Agency, Consciousness, and Executive Control. Philosophia 37 (1):21-30.
Neil Levy (2008). Restoring Control: Comments on George Sher. [REVIEW] Philosophia 36 (2):213-221.
John Martin Fischer (1999). The Value of Moral Responsibility. The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 1:129-140.
Morgan Wallhagen (2007). Consciousness and Action: Does Cognitive Science Support (Mild) Epiphenomenalism? British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 58 (3):539 - 561.
Elisabeth Pacherie (2007). The Sense of Control and the Sense of Agency. Psyche 13 (1):1 - 30.
Bernhard Hommel (2007). Consciousness and Control: Not Identical Twins. Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (1):155-176.
Valérie de Prycker (2011). Unself-Conscious Control: Broadening the Notion of Control Through Experiences of Flow and Wu-Wei. Zygon 46 (1):5-25.
Andy Clark (2001). Visual Experience and Motor Action: Are the Bonds Too Tight? Philosophical Review 110 (4):495-519.
Pete Mandik (2010). Control Consciousness. Topics in Cognitive Science 2 (4):643-657.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads61 ( #24,602 of 1,100,902 )
Recent downloads (6 months)5 ( #58,761 of 1,100,902 )
How can I increase my downloads?