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- Jerry S. Clegg (1974). Freud and the 'Homeric' Mind. Inquiry 17 (1-4):445 – 456.In spite of claims made by Freud himself and others in his behalf that psychoanalysis rests on clinical investigations alone, free of historical influence, there is good reason to believe that Freud's work belongs to the mainstream of Western intellectual history. His theories on the psychology of artistic creation, for instance, indicate that he was deeply influenced by Nietzsche but was moved to quarrel with him in behalf of even older contentions which date back to Plato. The very structure of Freud's theory of the mind can, indeed, be seen as the result of adjustments made in Nietzsche's psychology - adjustments which, in effect, amount to restatements of Platonic esthetic, political and social doctrine.
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