Two Conceptions of Response-Dependence

Philosophical Studies 107 (2):159 - 177 (2002)
Abstract
The traditional conception of response-dependence is inadequate because it cannot account for all intuitive cases of response-dependence. In particular, it is unable to account for the response-dependence of (aesthetic, moral, epistemic...) values. I therefore propose to supplement the traditional conception with an alternative one. My claim is that only a combination of the two conceptions is able to account for all intuitive cases of response-dependence.
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