The ontology of the analytic tradition and its origin: Realism and identity in Frege, Russell, Wittgenstein, and Quine
David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophia 28 (1-4):531-537 (2001)
This is a critical review of a book that defends two basic theses about analytic philosophy--that the 'no entity without identity' ontology is basic to the four great analytic philosophers and that they were 'modified realists.' This review calls into question both of these claims. The ontological views of Frege, Russell, Quine, Wittgenstein and others are discussed as well other central issues in analytic philosophy
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