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David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Axel Cleeremans (ed.)
Oxford University Press (2003)
Consciousness has many elements, from sensory experiences such as vision and bodily sensation, to nonsensory aspects such as memory and thought. All are presented as experiences of a single subject, and all seem to be contained within a unified field of experience. This unity raises many questions: How do diverse systems in the brain co-operate to produce a unified experience? Are there conditions under which this unity breaks down? Is conscious experience really unified at all? Such questions are addressed in this thought-provoking book
|Keywords||*Awareness Cognitive Processes Dissociation Experiences (Events) Neural Pathways Neuropsychology|
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Glyn W. Humphreys, Conscious Visual Representations Built From Multiple Binding Processes: Evidence From Neuropsychology.
R. C. O'Reilly, R. Busby & R. Soto, Three Forms of Binding and Their Neural Substrates: Alternatives to Temporal Synchrony.
Pierre Perruchet & Annie Vinter, Linking Learning and Consciousness: The Self-Organizing Consciousness (SOC) Model.
Catherine Tallon-Baudry, Oscillatory Synchrony as a Signature for the Unity of Visual Experience in Humans.
F. Varela & Evan Thompson, Neural Synchrony and the Unity of Mind: A Neurophenomenological Perspective.
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Kenneth R. Westphal (2006). Contemporary Epistemology: Kant, Hegel, McDowell. European Journal of Philosophy 14 (2):274–301.
Søren Harnow Klausen (2008). The Phenomenology of Propositional Attitudes. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 7 (4):445-462.
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