Justification-affording circular arguments

Philosophical Studies 111 (3):251 - 275 (2002)
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Abstract

An argument whose conclusion C is essential evidence for one of its premises can provide its target audience with justification for believing C. This is possible because we can enhance our justification for believing a proposition C by integrating it into an explanatory network of beliefs for which C itself provides essential evidence. I argue for this in light of relevant features of doxastic circularity, epistemic circularity, and explanatory inferences. Finally, I confirm my argument with an example and respond to objections.

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Andrew Cling
University of Alabama, Huntsville

Citations of this work

When Transmission Fails.Chris Tucker - 2010 - Philosophical Review 119 (4):497-529.
Transmission Failure Failure.Nicholas Silins - 2005 - Philosophical Studies 126 (1):71-102.
The epistemic regress problem.Andrew D. Cling - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 140 (3):401 - 421.

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References found in this work

Epistemic circularity.William P. Alston - 1986 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 47 (1):1-30.
Virtuous Circles.Michael P. Smith - 2010 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 25 (2):207-220.
Virtuous circles.Michael P. Smith - 1987 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 25 (2):207-220.

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