Justification-affording circular arguments

Philosophical Studies 111 (3):251 - 275 (2002)
Abstract
An argument whose conclusion C is essential evidence for one of its premises can provide its target audience with justification for believing C. This is possible because we can enhance our justification for believing a proposition C by integrating it into an explanatory network of beliefs for which C itself provides essential evidence. I argue for this in light of relevant features of doxastic circularity, epistemic circularity, and explanatory inferences. Finally, I confirm my argument with an example and respond to objections.
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    Citations of this work BETA
    Andrew D. Cling (2008). The Epistemic Regress Problem. Philosophical Studies 140 (3):401 - 421.
    Ken Levy (2009). The Solution to the Surprise Exam Paradox. Southern Journal of Philosophy 47 (2):131-158.
    Andrew D. Cling (2003). Self-Supporting Arguments. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (2):279–303.
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    T. Shogenji (2000). Self-Dependent Justification Without Circularity. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 51 (2):287-298.
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