Philosophy of Science 63 (3):158 (1996)
|Abstract||In their article "On What It Takes To Be a World", David Albert and Jeffrey Barrett raise "a rather urgent question about what the proponents of a many-worlds interpretation [of quantum mechanics] can possibly mean by the term 'worlds' " (1995, 35). I argue that their considerations do not translate into an argument against the Many-Worlds conception of a world unless one requires that the dispositions that measurement devices display through the outcomes they record be explainable in terms of facts particular to the worlds in which those devices do their recording. Granting that their conception of a world takes away the possibility of such an explanation, a Many-Worlds proponent can claim that the Universal quantum state, which does not represent a fact about any world in particular, is enough to ground the dispositions of measurement devices|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Simon Bostock (2003). Are All Possible Laws Actual Laws? Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (4):517 – 533.
Stephen Grover (2003). This World, ‘Adams Worlds’, and the Best of All Possible Worlds. Religious Studies 39 (2):145-163.
Lev Vaidman, Many-Worlds Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Phillip Bricker (2006). Absolute Actuality and the Plurality of Worlds. Philosophical Perspectives 20 (1):41–76.
David Z. Albert & Jeffrey A. Barrett (1995). On What It Takes to Be a World. Topoi 14 (1):35-37.
Michael E. Cuffaro (2012). Many Worlds, the Cluster-State Quantum Computer, and the Problem of the Preferred Basis. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B 43 (1):35-42.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads11 ( #99,523 of 549,093 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #63,317 of 549,093 )
How can I increase my downloads?