Graduate studies at Western
Philosophical Psychology 4 (3):303-23 (1991)
|Abstract||Abstract Meeting the eliminativist challenge to folk psychology requires showing that beliefs have explanatory virtues unlikely to be duplicated by non?cognitive accounts of behavior. The explanatory power of beliefs is rooted in their intentionality. That beliefs have a distinctive kind of intentionality is shown by the distinctive intensionality of the sentences which report them. Contrary to Fodor, the fundamental explanatory virtues of beliefs are not to be found in their capacity to make causally inactive properties relevant to the explanation of behavior. Rather, the distinctive intentionality of beliefs provides the best explanation of the fact that fully intelligent behavior displays a selectivity of response to properties of the perceptual environment|
|Keywords||Behavior Belief Intentionality Psychology Science|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Lynne Rudder Baker (1993). What Beliefs Are Not. In Steven J. Wagner & Richard Warner (eds.), Naturalism: A Critical Appraisal. University of Notre Dame Press (Notre Dame).
Sara Worley (1997). Belief and Consciousness. Philosophical Psychology 10 (1):41-55.
Greg Restall (1997). Ways Things Can't Be. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 38 (4):583-596.
Nicholas P. Power (1996). Fodor's Vindication of Folk Psychology and the Charge of Epiphenomenalism. Journal of Philosophical Research 21 (January):183-196.
Todd D. Janke (2008). Making Room for Bodily Intentionality. Polish Journal of Philosophy 2 (2):51-68.
Gordon R. Foxall (2007). Intentional Behaviorism. Behavior and Philosophy 35:1 - 55.
John D. Greenwood (ed.) (1991). The Future of Folk Psychology: Intentionality and Cognitive Science. Cambridge University Press.
F. Dreckmann (1999). Animal Beliefs and Their Contents. Erkenntnis 51 (1):597-615.
Nicholas S. Thompson & Patrick G. Derr (1993). The Intentionality of Some Ethological Terms. Behavior and Philosophy 2 (21):15-24.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads4 ( #189,051 of 739,304 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #61,243 of 739,304 )
How can I increase my downloads?