David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Oxford University Press (2013)
One mark of interpersonal relationships is a tendency to blame. But what precise evaluations and responses constitute blame? Is it most centrally a judgment, or is it an emotion, or something else? Does blame express a demand, or embody a protest, or does it simply mark an impaired relationship? What accounts for its force or sting, and how similar is it to punishment? The essays in this volume explore answers to these (and other) questions about the nature of blame, but they also explore the various norms that govern the propriety of blame. The traditional question is whether anyone ever deserves to be blamed, but the essays here provide a fresh perspective by focusing on blame from the blamer's perspective instead. Is our tendency to blame a vice, something we should work to replace with more humane ways of relating, or does it rather lie at the very heart of a commitment to morality? What can we legitimately expect of each other, and in general, what sort of attitude do would-be blamers need to have in order to have the standing to blame? Hypocritical or self-righteous blame seems objectionable, but why? The contributions to this volume aim to give us a fuller picture of the nature and norms of blame, and more generally of the promises and perils of membership in the human moral community.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Buy the book||$89.73 new (15% off) $91.78 used (13% off) $105.00 direct from Amazon Amazon page|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
D. Justin Coates & Neal A. Tognazzini (2012). The Nature and Ethics of Blame. Philosophy Compass 7 (3):197-207.
Neal A. Tognazzini (2013). Blameworthiness and the Affective Account of Blame. Philosophia 41 (4):1299-1312.
Matthew Talbert (2012). Moral Competence, Moral Blame, and Protest. Journal of Ethics 16 (1):89-109.
Pamela Hieronymi (2004). The Force and Fairness of Blame. Philosophical Perspectives 18 (1):115–148.
Matthew Talbert (2008). Blame and Responsiveness to Moral Reasons: Are Psychopaths Blameworthy? Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 89 (4):516-535.
Pamela Hieronymi (2008). Review: Sher's Defense of Blame. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 137 (1):19-30.
Thomas Scanlon (2008). Moral Dimensions: Permissibility, Meaning, Blame. Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
Miranda Fricker (2010). The Relativism of Blame and Williams's Relativism of Distance. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 84 (1):151-177.
David R. Mandel (2010). Predicting Blame Assignment in a Case of Negligent Harm. Mind and Society 9 (1):5-17.
Mark Alicke (2008). Blaming Badly. Journal of Cognition and Culture 8:179-186.
Michelle Mason (2011). Blame: Taking It Seriously. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 83 (2):473-481.
Angela M. Smith (2008). Character, Blameworthiness, and Blame: Comments on George Sher's in Praise of Blame. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 137 (1):31 - 39.
Garrath Williams, Praise and Blame. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Added to index2012-12-06
Total downloads20 ( #96,889 of 1,410,432 )
Recent downloads (6 months)3 ( #75,847 of 1,410,432 )
How can I increase my downloads?