Deviant causal chains and hallucinations: A problem for the anti-causalist

Philosophical Quarterly 50 (200):320-331 (2000)
Abstract
The subjective character of a given experience leaves open the question of its precise status. If it looks to a subject K as if there is an object of a kind F in front of him, the experience he is having could be veridical, or hallucinatory. Advocates of the Causal Theory of perception (whom I shall call.
Keywords Causation  Epistemology  Hallucination  Perception
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References found in this work BETA
Martin Davies (1983). Function in Perception. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 61 (December):409-426.
John Hyman (1992). The Causal Theory of Perception. Philosophical Quarterly 42 (168):277-296.
David Lewis (1980). Veridical Hallucination and Prosthetic Vision. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 58 (September):239-249.
E. J. Lowe (1996). Subjects of Experience. Cambridge University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA
Kenneth Hobson (2013). In Defense of Relational Direct Realism. European Journal of Philosophy 21 (4):550-574.
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