Graduate studies at Western
Philosophical Studies 129 (2):295 - 315 (2006)
|Abstract||Cognitive internalism is the view that moral judgments are both cognitive and motivating. Philosophers have found cognitive internalism to be attractive in part because it seems to offer support for the idea that moral reasons are categorical, that is, independent of agents’ desires. In this paper, I argue that it offers no such support.|
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