American Philosophical Quarterly 46 (2):105-115 (2009)
|Abstract||Truth is a value in that sense that a belief is good (or successful, or correct) just in case it is true. But it does not follow that truth is a good-making property, nor does it follow that the nature of truth explains its value. Instead, this paper argues that the nature of belief explains its value.|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Nishi Shah (2003). How Truth Governs Belief. Philosophical Review 112 (4):447-482.
Chase B. Wrenn (2010). True Belief is Not Instrumentally Valuable. In Cory D. Wright & Nikolaj J. L. L. Pedersen (eds.), New Waves in Truth. Palgrave Macmillan.
Michael P. Lynch (2009). Truth as One and Many. Clarendon Press.
Jerry Kapus (2007). Truth, Deflationism, and Success. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy 6:85-91.
Christopher P. Long (2010). Aristotle on the Nature of Truth. Cambridge University Press.
Mark A. Wrathall (1999). Heidegger and Truth as Correspondence. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 7 (1):69 – 88.
Ernest Sosa (1993). Epistemology, Realism, and Truth: The First Philosophical Perspectives Lecture. Philosophical Perspectives 7 (1):1-16.
Conor Mchugh (2012). The Truth Norm of Belief. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 93 (1):8-30.
Daniel Whiting (2012). Does Belief Aim (Only) at the Truth? Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 93 (2):279-300.
Nishi Shah (2006). A New Argument for Evidentialism. Philosophical Quarterly 56 (225):481–498.
Added to index2010-05-10
Total downloads34 ( #35,980 of 556,888 )
Recent downloads (6 months)4 ( #20,653 of 556,888 )
How can I increase my downloads?