David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Minds and Machines 7 (2):171-97 (1997)
The issue of what distinguishes systems which have original intentionalityfrom those which do not has been brought into sharp focus by Saul Kripke inhis discussion of the sceptical paradox he attributes to Wittgenstein.In this paper I defend a sophisticated version of the dispositionalistaccount of meaning against the principal objection raised by Kripke in hisattack on dispositional views. I argue that the objection put by the sceptic,to the effect that the dispositionalist cannot give a satisfactory account ofnormativity and mistake, in fact comprises a number of distinct lines ofargument, all of which can be satisfactorily answered by the dispositionalist
|Keywords||Epistemology Meaning Normativity Scepticism Kripke, S|
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Kai-Yuan Cheng (2011). A New Look at the Problem of Rule-Following: A Generic Perspective. Philosophical Studies 155 (1):1 - 21.
Adam C. Podlaskowski (2012). Simple Tasks, Abstractions, and Semantic Dispositionalism. Dialectica 66 (4):453-470.
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