Graduate studies at Western
Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2007)
|Abstract||Experiences of all kinds have a distinctive character, which marks them out as intrinsically different from states of consciousness such as thinking. A plausible view is that the difference should be accounted for by the fact that, in having an experience, the subject is somehow immediately aware of a range of phenomenal qualities. For example, in seeing, grasping and tasting an apple, the subject may be aware of a red and green spherical shape, a certain feeling of smoothness to touch, and a sweet sensation. Such phenomenal qualities are also immediately present in hallucinations. According to the sense-data theory, phenomenal qualities belong to items called “sense-data.” In having a perceptual experience the subject is directly aware of, or acquainted with, a sense-datum, even if the experience is illusory or hallucinatory. The sense-datum is an object immediately present in experience. It has the qualities it appears to have|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
D. H. Mellor (1973). Materialism and Phenomenal Qualities II. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 47 (July):107-19.
L. C. Holborow (1973). Materialism and Phenomenal Qualities. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 47 (July):107-19.
Ludwig Wittgenstein (1968). Notes for Lectures on Private Experience and Sense Data. Philosophical Review 77 (July):275-320.
David H. Sanford (1981). Illusions and Sense-Data. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 6 (1):371-385.
Michael G. F. Martin (2002). The Transparency of Experience. Mind and Language 4 (4):376-425.
Timothy L. S. Sprigge (1966). The Common‐Sense View of Physical Objects. Inquiry 9 (1-4):339-373.
Michael Huemer, Sense-Data. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Alex Byrne (forthcoming). Sensory Qualities, Sensible Qualities, Sensational Qualities. In Beckermann, McLaughlin & Walter (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind. Oxford University Press.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads81 ( #11,707 of 727,600 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #61,087 of 727,600 )
How can I increase my downloads?