Two Concepts of Epistemic Injustice

Episteme 7 (2):101-113 (2010)
I describe two concepts of epistemic injustice. The first of these concepts is explained through a critique of Alvin Goldman's veritistic social epistemology. The second is closely based on Miranda Fricker's concept of epistemic injustice. I argue that there is a tension between these two forms of epistemic injustice and tentatively suggest some ways of resolving the tension
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DOI 10.3366/epi.2010.0001
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Miranda Fricker (1999). Epistemic Oppression and Epistemic Privilege. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 29 (Supplement):191-210.

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