David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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European Journal of Philosophy 21 (2):320-333 (2013)
: Agents are enkratic when they intend to do what they believe they should. That rationality requires you to be enkratic is uncontroversial, yet you may be enkratic in a way that does not exhibit any rationality on your part. Thus, what I call the enkratic requirement demands that you be enkratic in the right way. In particular, I will argue that it demands that you base your belief about what you should do and your intention to do it on the same considerations. The idea is that, if you base your belief and your intention on different considerations, then you are inconsistent in your treatment of those considerations as reasons. The enkratic requirement demands that you be enkratic by treating considerations consistently as reasons
|Keywords||akrasia rationality rational requirement|
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Niko Kolodny (2005). Why Be Rational? Mind 114 (455):509-563.
John Broome (1999). Normative Requirements. Ratio 12 (4):398–419.
Stephen Kearns & Daniel Star (2009). Reasons as Evidence. Oxford Studies in Metaethics 4:215-42.
Julia Markovits (2010). Acting for the Right Reasons. Philosophical Review 119 (2):201-242.
Citations of this work BETA
Michael G. Titelbaum (2015). How to Derive a Narrow-Scope Requirement From Wide-Scope Requirements. Philosophical Studies 172 (2):535-542.
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