The Enkratic Requirement

European Journal of Philosophy 21 (2):320-333 (2013)
: Agents are enkratic when they intend to do what they believe they should. That rationality requires you to be enkratic is uncontroversial, yet you may be enkratic in a way that does not exhibit any rationality on your part. Thus, what I call the enkratic requirement demands that you be enkratic in the right way. In particular, I will argue that it demands that you base your belief about what you should do and your intention to do it on the same considerations. The idea is that, if you base your belief and your intention on different considerations, then you are inconsistent in your treatment of those considerations as reasons. The enkratic requirement demands that you be enkratic by treating considerations consistently as reasons
Keywords akrasia  rationality  rational requirement
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DOI 10.1111/j.1468-0378.2011.00449.x
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References found in this work BETA
Stephen Kearns & Daniel Star (2009). Reasons as Evidence. Oxford Studies in Metaethics 4:215-42.
Julia Markovits (2010). Acting for the Right Reasons. Philosophical Review 119 (2):201-242.

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