The Multiple Contents of Experience

Philosophical Topics 37 (1):25-47 (2009)
This paper examines the contents of perceptual experience, and focuses in particular on the relation between the representational aspects of an experience and its phenomenal character. It is argued that the Critical Realist two-component analysis of experience, advocated by Wilfrid Sellars, is preferable to the Intentionalist view. Experiences have different kinds of representational contents: both informational and intentional. An understanding of the essential navigational role of perception provides a principled way of explaining the nature of such representational contents. Experiences also have a distinct phenomenal content, or character, which is not determined by representational content
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.5840/philtopics200937114
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
Download options
PhilPapers Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 16,658
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Walter Hopp (2010). How to Think About Nonconceptual Content. The New Yearbook for Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy 10 (1):1-24.
Ben Caplan (2007). On the Content of Experience. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (3):590-611.

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

42 ( #79,782 of 1,725,959 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

11 ( #59,243 of 1,725,959 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

Start a new thread
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.