Varzi on Supervaluationism and Logical Consequence

Mind 120 (479):833-43 (2011)
Abstract
Though it is standardly assumed that supervaluationism applied to vagueness is committed to global validity, Achille Varzi (2007) argues that the supervaluationist should take seriously the idea of adopting local validity instead. Varzi’s motivation for the adoption of local validity is largely based on two objections against the global notion: that it brings some counterexamples to classically valid rules of inference and that it is inconsistent with unrestricted higher-order vagueness. In this discussion I review these objections and point out ways to address them not considered in Varzi’s paper.
Keywords Global Validity  Supervaluationism  Vagueness  Higher-order vagueness  Logical consequence
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Pablo Cobreros (2013). Vagueness: Subvaluationism. Philosophy Compass 8 (5):472-485.
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