Axiomathes 18 (1) (2008)
|Abstract||Two fundamental categories of any ontology are the category of objects and the category of universals. We discuss the question whether either of these categories can be infinite or not. In the category of objects, the subcategory of physical objects is examined within the context of different cosmological theories regarding the different kinds of fundamental objects in the universe. Abstract objects are discussed in terms of sets and the intensional objects of conceptual realism. The category of universals is discussed in terms of the three major theories of universals: nominalism, realism, and conceptualism. The finitude of mind pertains only to conceptualism. We consider the question of whether or not this finitude precludes impredicative concept formation. An explication of potential infinity, especially as applied to concepts and expressions, is given. We also briefly discuss a logic of plural objects, or groups of single objects (individuals), which is based on Bertrand Russell’s (1903, The principles of mathematics, 2nd edn. (1938). Norton & Co, NY) notion of a class as many. The universal class as many does not exist in this logic if there are two or more single objects; but the issue is undecided if there is just one individual. We note that adding plural objects (groups) to an ontology with a countable infinity of individuals (single objects) does not generate an uncountable infinity of classes as many.|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
B. Smith & D. M. Mark (1998). Ontology and Geographic Kinds. In T. Poiker & N. Chrisman (eds.), Proceedings of the 8th International Symposium on Spatial Data Handling, 308–320. International Geographic Union.
Daniel A. Kaufman (2002). Composite Objects and the Abstract/Concrete Distinction. Journal of Philosophical Research 27:215-238.
Christer Svennerlind (2008). Moderate Nominalism and Moderate Realism. Dissertation, Gothenburg University
Ned Markosian (2000). What Are Physical Objects? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61 (2):375-395.
Jiri Benovsky (2009). On (Not) Being in Two Places at the Same Time: An Argument Against Endurantism. American Philosophical Quarterly 46 (3).
Nino B. Cocchiarella (2002). On the Logic of Classes as Many. Studia Logica 70 (3):303-338.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads27 ( #45,755 of 549,064 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #63,185 of 549,064 )
How can I increase my downloads?