Logical atomism and modal logic

Philosophia 4 (1):41-66 (1974)
A propositional logic with modal operators for logical necessity and possibility is formulated as a formal ontology for logical atomism (with negative facts). It is shown that such modal operators represent purely formal, Internal 'properties' of propositions if and only if the notion of 'all possible worlds' has its standard and not the secondary interpretation which it is usually given (as, E.G., In kripke model-Structures). Allowing arbitrary restrictions on the notion of 'all possible worlds', At least in such a framework as logical atomism, Generates internal 'properties' of propositions with material instead of purely formal content
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References found in this work BETA
Wilfrid Sellars (1962). Naming and Saying. Philosophy of Science 29 (1):7-26.
Citations of this work BETA
Herbert E. Hendry & M. L. Pokriefka (1985). Carnapian Extensions of S. Journal of Philosophical Logic 14 (2):111 - 128.
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