David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Axiomathes 23 (2):301-321 (2013)
Conceptual realism begins with a conceptualist theory of the nexus of predication in our speech and mental acts, a theory that explains the unity of those acts in terms of their referential and predicable aspects. This theory also contains as an integral part an intensional realism based on predicate nominalization and a reflexive abstraction in which the intensional contents of our concepts are “object”-ified, and by which an analysis of predication with intensional verbs can be given. Through a second nominalization of the common names that are part of conceptual realism’s theory of reference (via quantifier phrases), the theory also accounts for both plural reference and predication and mass noun reference and predication. Finally, a separate nexus of predication based on natural kinds and the natural properties and relations nomologically related to those natural kinds, is also an integral part of the framework of conceptual realism
|Keywords||Conceptualism Nominalism Realism Logical realism Natural realism Formal ontology Predication nexus Exemplification Nominalization Intensional objects Classes as many Plural predication Plural reference Mass-noun predication Mass-noun reference Cognitive capacities Intersubjectively relizable Natural kinds Natural properties Invariance-symmetry principle Causal modalities|
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