David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Inquiry 41 (1):89 – 97 (1998)
The causal theory of action had suffered from inattention or linguistically motivated rejection until it was revived in 1963 by Donald Davidson. Since then the causal theory has had a continuing acceptance without having had an inspection of its assumptions. There are reasons to suspect that the theory is as unfounded as it is undoubted. Those reasons are reviewed here which have to do with the definitive moment when states such as beliefs and desires must change character to become causal events.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Jose S. Pescador Hierro (1997). Problemas del empirismo en la filosofía de la mente. Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 16 (2):35-49.
Ferenc Huoranszki (2006). Reasons and Passions. Acta Analytica 21 (2):41-53.
Todd Buras (2009). An Argument Against Causal Theories of Mental Content. American Philosophical Quarterly 46 (2):117-129.
Keith Campbell & Nicholas J. J. Smith, Epiphenomenalism. Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Richard Scheer (2004). The ‘Mental State’ Theory of Intentions. Philosophy 79 (1):121-131.
Robert N. Audi (1993). Mental Causation: Sustaining and Dynamic. In John Heil & Alfred R. Mele (eds.), Mental Causation. Oxford University Press.
David Lewis (1970). An Argument for the Identity Theory. Journal of Philosophy 63 (2):17-25.
Wayne A. Davis (2005). Reasons and Psychological Causes. Philosophical Studies 122 (1):51 - 101.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads14 ( #162,794 of 1,696,562 )
Recent downloads (6 months)2 ( #247,412 of 1,696,562 )
How can I increase my downloads?