Distributive justice and co-operation in a world of humans and non-humans: A contractarian argument for drawing non-humans into the sphere of justice
Res Publica 15 (1):67-84 (2009)
|Abstract||Various arguments have been provided for drawing non-humans such as animals and artificial agents into the sphere of moral consideration. In this paper, I argue for a shift from an ontological to a social-philosophical approach: instead of asking what an entity is, we should try to conceptually grasp the quasi-social dimension of relations between non-humans and humans. This allows me to reconsider the problem of justice, in particular distributive justice . Engaging with the work of Rawls, I show that an expansion of the contractarian framework to non-humans causes an important problem for liberalism, but can be justified by a contractarian argument. Responding to Bell’s and Nussbaum’s comments on Rawls, I argue that we can justify drawing non-humans into the sphere of distributive justice by relying on the notion of a co-operative scheme. I discuss what co-operation between humans and non-humans can mean and the extent to which it depends on properties. I conclude that we need to imagine principles of ecological and technological distributive justice.|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Gorik Ooms (2010). Why the West Is Perceived as Being Unworthy of Cooperation. Journal of Law, Medicine and Ethics 38 (3):594-613.
Elizabeth Cripps (2010). Saving the Polar Bear, Saving the World: Can the Capabilities Approach Do Justice to Humans, Animals and Ecosystems? Res Publica 16 (1):1-22.
Mark Walker (2009). The Anthropic Argument Against the Existence of God. Sophia 48 (4):351 - 378.
David E. W. Fenner (1998). Animal Rights and the Problem of Proximity. International Journal of Applied Philosophy 12 (1):51-61.
Simon Caney (2011). Humanity, Associations and Global Justice: A Defence of Humanity-Centred Cosmopolitan Egalitarianism. The Monist 94 (4):506-534.
Edward Stein (1997). Can We Be Justified in Believing That Humans Are Irrational? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (3):545-565.
Julia Tanner (2009). The Argument From Marginal Cases and the Slippery Slope Objection. Environmental Values (18):51-66.
James P. Sterba (2005). Global Justice for Humans or for All Living Beings and What Difference It Makes. Journal of Ethics 9 (1-2):283 - 300.
Julia Tanner (2006). Marginal Humans, The Argument From Kinds, And The Similarity Argument. Facta Universitatis 5 (1):47-63.
Mark Ereshefsky (2007). Where the Wild Things Are: Environmental Preservation and Human Nature. Biology and Philosophy 22 (1):57-72.
Added to index2009-04-01
Total downloads22 ( #56,280 of 549,754 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #63,425 of 549,754 )
How can I increase my downloads?