Contextualism and Interest-Relative Invariantism

Abstract
Classical Invariantism (CI): The truth-value of a given knowledge-ascribing (-denying) sentence is (a) invariant across conversational contexts and (b) independent of how important it is to the subject (S) that the relevant proposition (P) be true.
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    Robin McKenna (2013). Epistemic Contextualism: A Normative Approach. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 94 (1):101-123.
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