Contextualism and Interest-Relative Invariantism
| Abstract | Classical Invariantism (CI): The truth-value of a given knowledge-ascribing (-denying) sentence is (a) invariant across conversational contexts and (b) independent of how important it is to the subject (S) that the relevant proposition (P) be true. | |||||||||
| Keywords | No keywords specified (fix it) | |||||||||
| Categories | ||||||||||
| Options |
|
|||||||||
Download options| PhilPapers Archive |
Upload a copy of this paper Check publisher's policy on self-archival Papers currently archived: 5,679 |
| External links |
  Try with proxy. |
| Through your library | Only published papers are available at libraries |
Similar books and articlesRobin McKenna (2013). Epistemic Contextualism: A Normative Approach. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 94 (1):101-123.
Chandra Sekhar Sripada & Jason Stanley (2012). Empirical tests of interest-relative invariantism. Episteme 9 (1):3-26.
Stephen Schiffer (2007). Interest-Relative Invariantism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (1):188-195.
Stephen Schiffer (2007). Interest-Relative Invariantism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (1):188-195.
John MacFarlane (2005). Knowledge Laundering: Testimony and Sensitive Invariantism. Analysis 65 (286):132–138.
N. Ángel Pinillos (2011). Some Recent Work in Experimental Epistemology. Philosophy Compass 6 (10):675-688.
Martijn Blaauw (2008). Subject Sensitive Invariantism: In Memoriam. Philosophical Quarterly 58 (231):318–325.
John Turri (2010). Epistemic Invariantism and Speech Act Contextualism. Philosophical Review 119 (1):77-95.
Joanna Odrowąż-Sypniewska (2009). Czy wiedza jest zależna od kontekstu? Kontekstualizm a inwariantyzm praktyczny. Filozofia Nauki 4.
Tim Black (2005). Classic Invariantism, Relevance and Warranted Assertability Manœvres. Philosophical Quarterly 55 (219):328–336.
Kent Bach (2009). Perspectives on Possibilities: Contextualism, Relativism, or What? In Andy Egan & B. Weatherson (eds.), Epistemic Modality. Oxford University Press.
Keith DeRose (2005). The Ordinary Language Basis for Contextualism, and the New Invariantism. Philosophical Quarterly 55 (219):172–198.
Timothy Williamson (2005). Contextualism, Subject-Sensitive Invariantism and Knowledge of Knowledge. Philosophical Quarterly 55 (219):213–235.
Stewart Cohen (2005). Knowledge, Speaker and Subject. Philosophical Quarterly 55 (219):199–212.
Analytics
Monthly downloads |
Added to index2010-12-22Total downloads28 ( #44,089 of 549,078 )Recent downloads (6 months)5 ( #15,152 of 549,078 )How can I increase my downloads? |
My notes
Discussion
