Does luck exclude control?

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (3):499-504 (2009)
Many philosophers hold that luck excludes control-more precisely, that an event is lucky for you only if that event lies beyond your control. Call this the Lack of Control Requirement (LCR) on luck. Jennifer Lackey [2008] has recently argued that there is no such requirement on luck. Should such an argument succeed, it would (among other things) disable a main objection to the "libertarian" position in the free will debate. After clarifying the LCR, I defend it against both Lackey's argument and a novel argument different in kind from Lackey's. I undermine each of these arguments by sketching a plausible error theory for its key intuition. For each argument, there's a natural reply available to its proponents. I show that these natural replies depend on certain mistaken general principles about luck. Neither Lackey's argument nor the novel argument I consider casts serious doubt on the LCR. [Word count: 147].
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DOI 10.1080/00048400802674677
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References found in this work BETA
Fred I. Dretske (1970). Epistemic Operators. Journal of Philosophy 67 (24):1007-1023.
Jennifer Lackey (2008). What Luck is Not. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (2):255 – 267.
E. J. Coffman (2007). Thinking About Luck. Synthese 158 (3):385 - 398.
Michael J. Zimmerman (2010). Moral Luck. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 36 (4):585-608.

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Duncan Pritchard (2015). Risk. Metaphilosophy 46 (3):436-461.

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