David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophical Explorations 13 (2):157-166 (2011)
The Luck Argument is among the most influential objections to the main brand of libertarianism about metaphysical freedom and moral responsibility. In his work, Alfred Mele [2006. Free will and luck . Oxford: Oxford University Press] develops - and then attempts to defeat - the literature's most promising version of the Luck Argument. After explaining Mele's version of the Luck Argument, I present two objections to his novel reply to the argument. I argue for the following two claims: (1) Mele's reply is either otiose or undermined by his own defense of the Luck Argument from a different objection and (2) Mele's reply turns out to lack the form required to engage the step of the Luck Argument it targets. Having shown that the failure of Mele's novel attack is overdetermined, I close by defending a different (and, I believe, decisive) objection to the Luck Argument - which, as it happens, lurks right under Mele's nose
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References found in this work BETA
Alfred R. Mele (2006). Free Will and Luck. Oxford University Press.
Timothy O'Connor (2000). Persons and Causes: The Metaphysics of Free Will. Oxford University Press.
Alfred R. Mele (2007). Free Will and Luck. Philosophical Explorations 10 (2):153 – 155.
Harry G. Frankfurt (1969). Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility. Journal of Philosophy 66 (3):829-39.
Alfred R. Mele & David Robb (1998). Rescuing Frankfurt-Style Cases. Philosophical Review 107 (1):97-112.
Citations of this work BETA
Alfred Mele (2013). Moral Responsibility and the Continuation Problem. Philosophical Studies 162 (2):237-255.
Ishtiyaque Haji (2012). Reason, Responsibility, and Free Will: Reply to My Critics. [REVIEW] Journal of Ethics 16 (2):175-209.
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