David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
This paper assesses several prominent recent attacks on the view that epistemic justification is conceptually prior to knowledge. I argue that this view—call it the Received View (RV)—emerges from these attacks unscathed. I start with Timothy Williamson’s two strongest arguments for the claim that all evidence is knowledge (E>K), which impugns RV when combined with the claim that justification depends on evidence. One of Williamson’s arguments assumes a false epistemic closure principle; the other misses some alternative (to E>K) explanations of a putative fact about the evidence a particular subject has. Next, I neutralize each of Jonathan Sutton’s three recent arguments to the conclusion that any justified belief constitutes knowledge. Finally, I consider a recent analysis of justification due to Alexander Bird, according to which justified belief is possible knowledge. I argue that Bird’s analysis delivers neither a sufficient nor (more importantly) a necessary condition for justification. [Word count: 149].
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library||
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Christoph Kelp (2011). Not Without Justification. Dialectica 65 (4):581-595.
B. J. C. Madison (2010). Is Justification Knowledge? Journal of Philosophical Research 35:173-191.
Jonathan Sutton (2005). Stick to What You Know. Noûs 39 (3):359–396.
Alexander Bird (2007). Justified Judging. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (1):81-110.
E. J. Coffman (forthcoming). Critical Notice of Jonathan Sutton, Without Justification. Philosophical Books.
Peter D. Klein (1983). Real Knowledge. Synthese 55 (2):143 - 164.
Steven L. Reynolds (2013). Justification as the Appearance of Knowledge. Philosophical Studies 163 (2):367-383.
Andrew Naylor (1983). Justification in Memory Knowledge. Synthese 55 (2):269 - 286.
William P. Alston (1983). What's Wrong with Immediate Knowledge? Synthese 55 (April):73-96.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads57 ( #33,857 of 1,679,326 )
Recent downloads (6 months)6 ( #39,951 of 1,679,326 )
How can I increase my downloads?