Luck and standard libertarianism

Abstract
‘Standard Libertarianism’ (‘SL’) says that you act freely on a given occasion only if the past and laws of nature do not entail your acting as you do then. The so-called “Luck Argument” is one of the premier objections to SL. I here provide a reply to the Luck Argument that’s superior to ones prominent in the literature. §1 presents a common version of the Luck Argument, and highlights a challenge its proponents face. §2 identifies two desiderata of a reply to the Luck Argument, and uses them to reveal considerable shortcomings of prominent replies. §3 assesses the best extant version of the Luck Argument, one due to Alfred Mele. I present three replies to Mele’s argument, each of which meets §2’s desiderata. §4 evaluates another version of the Luck Argument, one involving an account of luck different from Mele’s. I argue that this version impugns nothing in SL’s neighborhood.
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