Luck and standard libertarianism
| Abstract | ‘Standard Libertarianism’ (‘SL’) says that you act freely on a given occasion only if the past and laws of nature do not entail your acting as you do then. The so-called “Luck Argument” is one of the premier objections to SL. I here provide a reply to the Luck Argument that’s superior to ones prominent in the literature. §1 presents a common version of the Luck Argument, and highlights a challenge its proponents face. §2 identifies two desiderata of a reply to the Luck Argument, and uses them to reveal considerable shortcomings of prominent replies. §3 assesses the best extant version of the Luck Argument, one due to Alfred Mele. I present three replies to Mele’s argument, each of which meets §2’s desiderata. §4 evaluates another version of the Luck Argument, one involving an account of luck different from Mele’s. I argue that this version impugns nothing in SL’s neighborhood. | |||||||||
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Free Will & Luck (2007). Good Luck to Libertarians. Philosophical Explorations 10 (2):173 – 184.
E. J. Coffman (2009). Does Luck Exclude Control? Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (3):499-504.
David Blumenfeld (2011). Lucky Agents, Big and Little: Should Size Really Matter? Philosophical Studies 156 (3):311-319.
Alfred R. Mele (2005). Libertarianism, Luck, and Control. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 86 (3):381-407.
Timothy O'Connor (2007). Is It All Just a Matter of Luck? Philosophical Explorations 10 (2):157 – 161.
Christopher Evan Franklin (2011). Farewell to the Luck (and Mind) Argument. Philosophical Studies 156 (2):199-230.
E. J. Coffman & Ted A. Warfield (2007). Alfred Mele's Metaphysical Freedom? Philosophical Explorations 10 (2):185 – 194.
Derk Pereboom (2007). On Alfred Mele's Free Will and Luck. Philosophical Explorations 10 (2):163 – 172.
E. J. Coffman (2011). How (Not) to Attack the Luck Argument. Philosophical Explorations 13 (2):157-166.
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