Misleading Dispositions and the Value of Knowledge

Gettiered beliefs are those whose agents are subject to the kind of epistemologically significant luck illustrated by Gettier Cases. Provided that knowledge requires ungettiered belief, we can learn something about knowledge by figuring out how luck blocks it in Gettier Cases. After criticizing the most promising of the going approaches to gettiered belief—the Risk of False Belief Approach—, I explain and defend a new approach: the Risk of Misleading Dispositions Approach.Roughly, this view says that a belief is gettiered just in case its unfortunate subject has at best just luckily avoided being disposed by his belief’s actual grounds to believe a wide class of falsehoods about his environment. I then show how this approach undercuts an influential recent argument that knowledge has no more value than certain subsets of its components
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.5840/jpr_2010_13
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
Download options
PhilPapers Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 16,658
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Tomas Bogardus (2013). Knowledge Under Threat. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (1):289-313.
Sandy Goldberg (2015). Epistemic Entitlement and Luck. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 91 (2):273-302.
Michael Veber (2013). I Know I Am Not Gettiered. Analytic Philosophy 54 (4):401-420.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

39 ( #85,375 of 1,726,122 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

10 ( #66,646 of 1,726,122 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

Start a new thread
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.