|Abstract||In this paper, we argue that Richard Foley’s account of rational belief faces an as yet undefeated objection, then try to repair one of Foley’s two failed replies to that objection. In §§I-III, we explain Foley’s accounts of all-things-considered rational belief and responsible belief, along with his replies to two pressing objections to those accounts—what we call the Irrelevance Objection (to Foley’s account of rational belief) and the Insufficiency Objection (to his account of responsible belief). In §IV, we argue that both of Foley’s replies to the Irrelevance Objection fail as currently developed, and raise the question whether either of his replies can be salvaged. In §V, we invoke cases involving religious beliefs (broadly construed) to show that one of Foley’s failed replies to the Irrelevance Objection conflicts with his reply to the Insufficiency Objection; and we provide reason to think Foley should resolve this conflict in the latter’s favor. We conclude in §VI by suggesting a way to repair Foley’s other failed reply to the Irrelevance Objection, yielding an improved overall defense of Foley’s accounts of rational and responsible belief. We look forward to discussing the important question to what extent this improved overall defense succeeds. I Let’s start with Foley’s account of all-things-considered rational belief (cf. 2008: 49, 2005a.|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||No categories specified (fix it)|
|Through your library||Only published papers are available at libraries|
Similar books and articles
Duncan Pritchard (2004). Epistemic Deflationism. Southern Journal of Philosophy 42 (1):103-134.
J. J. MacIntosh (1994). Belief-in Revisited: A Reply to Williams. Religious Studies 30 (4):487 - 503.
Patrick Lee (1989). Reasons and Religious Belief. Faith and Philosophy 6 (1):19-34.
Axel Gelfert (2005). Richard Foley: Intellectual Trust in Oneself and Others. [REVIEW] Logical Analysis and History of Philosophy 8:220-227.
Anthony Robert Booth & Rik Peels (2010). Why Responsible Belief is Blameless Belief. Journal of Philosophy 107 (5):257-265.
Richard Foley (1990). Fumerton's Puzzle. Journal of Philosophical Research 15:109-113.
Richard Foley (2009). Beliefs, Degrees of Belief, and the Lockean Thesis. In Franz Huber & Christoph Schmidt-Petri (eds.), Degrees of Belief. Springer.
Richard Foley (1993). Working Without a Net: A Study of Egocentric Epistemology. Oxford University Press.
James Hawthorne (2009). The Lockean Thesis and the Logic of Belief. In Franz Huber & Christoph Schmidt-Petri (eds.), Degrees of Belief. Synthese Library: Springer.
Added to index2010-02-01
Total downloads12 ( #93,300 of 549,010 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #63,261 of 549,010 )
How can I increase my downloads?