Synthese 181 (3):471-488 (2011)
|Abstract||This paper has two main parts. In the first part, I argue that prominent moves in two related current debates in epistemology—viz., the debates over classical invariantism and the knowledge first movement—depend on one or the other of two claims about epistemic propriety: (1) Impropriety due to lack of a particular epistemic feature suffices for epistemic impropriety; and (2) Having justification to believe P suffices for having warrant to assert P. In the second part, I present and defend novel arguments against both claims.|
|Keywords||Epistemic justification Warrant Knowledge Belief Assertion|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Andrei Buckareff (2009). Metaepistemology and Divine Revelation. Heythrop Journal 50 (1):85-90.
Gideon Rosen (2007). The Case Against Epistemic Relativism: Reflections on Chapter 6 of Fear of Knowledge. Episteme 4 (1):10-29.
William A. Rottschaefer (2003). Assessing the Role of Non-Epistemic Feminist Values in Scientific Inquiry. Behavior and Philosophy 31:225 - 249.
J. Angelo Corlett (2008). Epistemic Responsibility. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 16 (2):179 – 200.
Kristina Rolin (2006). The Bias Paradox in Feminist Standpoint Epistemology. Episteme 3 (1-2):125-136.
Matthew Chrisman (2010). From Epistemic Expressivism to Epistemic Inferentialism. In Adrian Haddock, Alan Millar & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Social Epistemology. Oxford University Press.
Dan Zeman (2010). Knowledge Attributions and Relevant Epistemic Standards. In Recanati François, Stojanovic Isidora & Villanueva Neftali (eds.), Context Dependence, Perpsective and Relativity. Mouton de Gruyter.
Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij (2013). Moderate Epistemic Expressivism. Philosophical Studies 163 (2):337-357.
Dan Zeman (2010). Knowledge Attributions and Relevant Epistemic Standards. In François Recanati, Isidora Stojanovic & Neftali Villanueva (eds.), Context-dependence, Perspective and Relativity. Mouton de Gruyter.
Added to index2010-03-31
Total downloads29 ( #48,060 of 722,826 )
Recent downloads (6 months)0
How can I increase my downloads?