Two claims about epistemic propriety

Synthese 181 (3):471-488 (2011)
This paper has two main parts. In the first part, I argue that prominent moves in two related current debates in epistemology—viz., the debates over classical invariantism and the knowledge first movement—depend on one or the other of two claims about epistemic propriety: (1) Impropriety due to lack of a particular epistemic feature suffices for epistemic impropriety; and (2) Having justification to believe P suffices for having warrant to assert P. In the second part, I present and defend novel arguments against both claims.
Keywords Epistemic justification  Warrant  Knowledge  Belief  Assertion
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Robert Brandom (1983). Asserting. Noûs 17 (4):637-650.

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