Are Turing Machines Platonists? Inferentialism and the Computational Theory of Mind
Minds and Machines 20 (3):423-439 (2010)
| Abstract | We first discuss Michael Dummett’s philosophy of mathematics and Robert Brandom’s philosophy of language to demonstrate that inferentialism entails the falsity of Church’s Thesis and, as a consequence, the Computational Theory of Mind. This amounts to an entirely novel critique of mechanism in the philosophy of mind, one we show to have tremendous advantages over the traditional Lucas-Penrose argument | |||||||||
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