Are Turing Machines Platonists? Inferentialism and the Computational Theory of Mind

Minds and Machines 20 (3):423-439 (2010)
We first discuss Michael Dummett’s philosophy of mathematics and Robert Brandom’s philosophy of language to demonstrate that inferentialism entails the falsity of Church’s Thesis and, as a consequence, the Computational Theory of Mind. This amounts to an entirely novel critique of mechanism in the philosophy of mind, one we show to have tremendous advantages over the traditional Lucas-Penrose argument
Keywords Mechanism  Church’s thesis  Computational theory of mind  Dualism  Inferentialism  Platonism  Lucas-Penrose argument  Brandom  Dummett  Detlefsen  Wright
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1007/s11023-010-9203-1
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
Download options
PhilPapers Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 16,658
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

View all 18 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Eric Steinhart (2003). Supermachines and Superminds. Minds and Machines 13 (1):155-186.
Robert H. Kane (1966). Turing Machines and Mental Reports. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 44 (December):344-52.

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

204 ( #8,262 of 1,725,992 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

43 ( #27,102 of 1,725,992 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

Start a new thread
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.