Inferentialism and Tacit Knowledge

Behavior and Philosophy 32 (2):503 - 524 (2004)
A central tenet of cognitivism is that knowing how is to be explained in terms of tacitly knowing that a theory is true. By critically examining canonical anti-behaviorist arguments and contemporary appeals to tacit knowledge, I have devised a more explicit characterization in which tacitly known theories must act as justifiers for claims that the tacit knower is capable of explicitly endorsing. In this manner the new account is specifically tied to verbal behavior. In addition, if the analysis is correct then it follows that the scope and nature of cognitivist appeals to tacit knowledge are largely mistaken.
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DOI 10.2307/27759500
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