An Essay on Belief and Acceptance

New York: Clarendon Press (1992)
In this incisive new book one of Britain's most eminent philosophers explores the often overlooked tension between voluntariness and involuntariness in human cognition. He seeks to counter the widespread tendency for analytic epistemology to be dominated by the concept of belief. Is scientific knowledge properly conceived as being embodied, at its best, in a passive feeling of belief or in an active policy of acceptance? Should a jury's verdict declare what its members involuntarily believe or what they voluntarily accept? And should statements and assertions be presumed to express what their authors believe or what they accept? Does such a distinction between belief and acceptance help to resolve the paradoxes of self-deception and akrasia? Must people be taken to believe everything entailed by what they believe, or merely to accept everything entailed by what they accept? Through a systematic examination of these problems, the author sheds new light on issues of crucial importance in contemporary epistemology, philosophy of mind, and cognitive science
Keywords Acceptance  Belief  Cognition  Epistemology  Intentionality  Knowledge  Mind  Perception  Reason  Science
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Call number BD161.C633 1992
ISBN(s) 0198242948   0198236042  
DOI 10.2307/2186104
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Richard Dub (2015). Delusions, Acceptances, and Cognitive Feelings. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 91 (2):n/a-n/a.

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