Are external reasons impossible?

Ethics 96 (3):545-556 (1986)
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DOI 10.1086/292774
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John Brunero (2008). McDowell on External Reasons. European Journal of Philosophy 16 (1):22–42.
Joshua Gert (2003). Two Concepts of Rationality. Southern Journal of Philosophy 41 (3):367-398.

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