An objective counterfactual theory of information

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (3):333 – 352 (2006)
Abstract
We offer a novel theory of information that differs from traditional accounts in two respects: (i) it explains information in terms of counterfactuals rather than conditional probabilities, and (ii) it does not make essential reference to doxastic states of subjects, and consequently allows for the sort of objective, reductive explanations of various notions in epistemology and philosophy of mind that many have wanted from an account of information
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Hilmi Demir (2012). The Counterfactual Theory of Information Revisited. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (1):183 - 185.

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