David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Noûs 41 (2):335–353 (2007)
Color relationalism is the view that colors are constituted in terms of relations to perceiving subjects. Among its explanatory virtues, relation- alism provides a satisfying treatment of cases of perceptual variation. But it can seem that relationalists lack resources for saying that a representa- tion of x’s color is erroneous. Surely, though, a theory of color that makes errors of color perception impossible cannot be correct. In this paper I’ll argue that, initial appearances notwithstanding, relationalism contains the resources to account for errors of color perception. I’ll conclude that worries about making room for error are worries the relationalist can meet
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Citations of this work BETA
Pendaran Roberts & Kelly Schmidtke (2012). In Defense of Incompatibility, Objectivism, and Veridicality About Color. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 3 (4):547-558.
Jeff Speaks (2011). Spectrum Inversion Without a Difference in Representation is Impossible. Philosophical Studies 156 (3):339-361.
Pendaran Roberts, James Andow & Kelly Schmidtke (2014). Colour Relationalism and the Real Deliverances of Introspection. Erkenntnis 79 (5):1173-1189.
Riccardo Manzotti (2009). No Time, No Wholes: A Temporal and Causal-Oriented Approach to the Ontology of Wholes. [REVIEW] Axiomathes 19 (2):193-214.
Dimitria Electra Gatzia (2010). The Individual Variability Problem. Philosophia 38 (3):533-554.
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