Color: A functionalist proposal
Philosophical Studies 113 (1):1-42 (2003)
| Abstract | In this paper I propose and defend an account of color that I call color functionalism. I argue that functionalism is a non-traditional species of primary quality theory, and that it accommodates our intuitions about color and the facts of color science better than more widely discussed alternatives | |||||||||
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