Color and perceptual variation revisited: Unknown facts, alien modalities, and perfect psychosemantics
Graduate studies at Western
Dialectica 60 (3):307-319 (2006)
|Abstract||An adequate ontology of color must face the empirical facts about per- ceptual variation. In this paper I begin by reviewing a range of data about perceptual variation, and showing how they tell against color physicalism and motivate color relationalism. Next I consider a series of objections to the argument from perceptual variation, and argue that they are un- persuasive. My conclusion will be that the argument remains a powerful obstacle for color physicalism, and a powerful reason to believe in color relationalism instead|
|Keywords||REALISM SCIENCE VISION|
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