Colour constancy as counterfactual

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (1):61 – 92 (2008)
Abstract
There is nothing in this World constant but Inconstancy. [Swift 1711: 258] In this paper I argue that two standard characterizations of colour constancy are inadequate to the phenomenon. This inadequacy matters, since, I contend, philosophical appeals to colour constancy as a way of motivating illumination-independent conceptions of colour turn crucially on the shortcomings of these characterizations. After critically reviewing the standard characterizations, I provide a novel counterfactualist understanding of colour constancy, argue that it avoids difficulties of its traditional rivals, and defend it from objections. Finally, I show why, on this improved understanding, colour constancy does not have the philosophical consequences that have been claimed for it in the literature
Keywords color   perception   constancy
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References found in this work BETA
Jonathan Cohen & Aaron Meskin (2004). On the Epistemic Value of Photographs. Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 62 (2):197–210.
David H. Foster (2003). Does Colour Constancy Exist? Trends in Cognitive Sciences 7 (10):439-443.

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Citations of this work BETA
Michael Madary (2012). Husserl on Perceptual Constancy. European Journal of Philosophy 20 (1):145-165.
Joshua Gert (2013). Color Constancy and Dispositionalism. Philosophical Studies 162 (2):183-200.

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