Consciousness cannot be separated from function

Trends in Cognitive Sciences 15 (8):358--364 (2011)
Abstract
Here, we argue that any neurobiological theory based on an experience/function division cannot be empirically confirmed or falsified and is thus outside the scope of science. A ‘perfect experiment’ illustrates this point, highlighting the unbreachable boundaries of the scientific study of consciousness. We describe a more nuanced notion of cognitive access that captures personal experience without positing the existence of inaccessible conscious states. Finally, we discuss the criteria necessary for forming and testing a falsifiable theory of consciousness
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References found in this work BETA
Ned Block (1995). On a Confusion About a Function of Consciousness. Brain and Behavioral Sciences 18 (2):227-–247.
Jean Bullier (2001). Feedback Connections and Conscious Vision. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 5 (9):369-370.

View all 29 references

Citations of this work BETA
Tobias Schlicht (2012). Phenomenal Consciousness, Attention and Accessibility. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 11 (3):309-334.

View all 15 citations

Similar books and articles
Jean E. Burns (1991). Does Consciousness Perform a Function Independently of the Brain? Frontier Perspectives, Center for Frontier Sciences, Temple University 2 (1):19-34.
Ned Block (1995). On a Confusion About a Function of Consciousness. Brain and Behavioral Sciences 18 (2):227-–247.
David Rosenthal (2012). Higher-Order Awareness, Misrepresentation, and Function. Higher-Order Awareness, Misrepresentation and Function 367 (1594):1424-1438.
David M. Rosenthal (1997). A Theory of Consciousness. In Ned Block, Owen J. Flanagan & Guven Guzeldere (eds.), The Nature of Consciousness. Mit Press.
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