Colours, colour relationalism and the deliverances of introspection

Analysis 70 (2):218 - 228 (2010)
Abstract
An important motivation for relational theories of color is that they resolve apparent conflicts about color: x can, without contradiction, be red relative to S1 and not red relative to S2. Alas, many philosophers claim that the view is incompatible with naive, phenomenally grounded introspection. However, when we presented normal adults with apparent conflicts about color (among other properties), we found that many were open to the relationalist's claim that apparently competing variants can simultaneously be correct. This suggests that, philosophers' claims to the contrary notwithstanding, introspection does not supply authoritative and unambiguous reason to reject color relationalism.
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    References found in this work BETA
    Mark Johnston (1992). How to Speak of the Colors. Philosophical Studies 68 (3):221-263.
    Colin McGinn (1996). Another Look at Color. Journal of Philosophy 93 (11):537-53.
    Stephen Yablo (1995). Singling Out Properties. Philosophical Perspectives 9:477-502.
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