David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Analysis 70 (2):218 - 228 (2010)
An important motivation for relational theories of color is that they resolve apparent conflicts about color: x can, without contradiction, be red relative to S1 and not red relative to S2. Alas, many philosophers claim that the view is incompatible with naive, phenomenally grounded introspection. However, when we presented normal adults with apparent conflicts about color (among other properties), we found that many were open to the relationalist's claim that apparently competing variants can simultaneously be correct. This suggests that, philosophers' claims to the contrary notwithstanding, introspection does not supply authoritative and unambiguous reason to reject color relationalism.
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Citations of this work BETA
James Andow (2015). Expecting Moral Philosophers to Be Reliable. Dialectica 69 (2):205-220.
Pendaran Roberts & Kelly Ann Schmidtke (forthcoming). Relationalism About Perceptible Properties and the Principle of Charity. Synthese:1-25.
Pendaran Roberts, James Andow & Kelly Schmidtke (2014). Colour Relationalism and the Real Deliverances of Introspection. Erkenntnis 79 (5):1173-1189.
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