Color properties and color ascriptions: A relationalist manifesto

Philosophical Review 113 (4):451-506 (2004)
Abstract
Are colors relational or non-relational properties of their bearers? Is red a property that is instantiated by all and only the objects with a certain intrinsic (/non-relational) nature? Or does an object with a particular intrinsic (/non-relational) nature count as red only in virtue of standing in certain relations - for example, only when it looks a certain way to a certain perceiver, or only in certain circumstances of observation? In this paper I shall argue for the view that color properties are relational (henceforth, relationalism), and against the view that colors are not relational (henceforth, anti- or non-relationalism)
Keywords PHENOMENAL CHARACTER   VISUAL PIGMENTS   CONSTANCY   VISION   REALISM   SENSITIVITY   SCIENCE   RETINA   CONES
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Nat Hansen (2011). Color Adjectives and Radical Contextualism. Linguistics and Philosophy 34 (3):201-221.

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