Ethics and Behavior 7 (2):91 – 102 (1997)
|Abstract||A right, unlike an interest, is a valid claim, or potential claim, made by a moral agent, under principles that govern both the claimant and the target of the claim. Animals cannot be the bearers of rights because the concept of rights is essentially human; it is rooted in and has force within a human moral world.|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Tom Regan (1995). Obligations to Animals Are Based on Rights. Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 8 (2):171-180.
Richard A. Watson (1979). Self-Consciousness and the Rights of Nonhuman Animals and Nature. Environmental Ethics 1 (2):99-129.
Thomas Auxter (1979). The Right Not to Be Eaten. Inquiry 22 (1-4):221 – 230.
Mark Rowlands (2009). Animal Rights: Moral Theory and Practice. Palgrave Macmillan.
Nathan Nobis (2004). Carl Cohen's 'Kind' Arguments for Animal Rights and Against Human Rights. Journal of Applied Philosophy 21 (1):43–59.
Tom L. Beauchamp (1997). Opposing Views on Animal Experimentation: Do Animals Have Rights? Ethics and Behavior 7 (2):113 – 121.
Mark Rowlands (1998). Animal Rights: A Philosophical Defence. St. Martin's Press.
H. J. McCloskey (1979). Moral Rights and Animals. Inquiry 22 (1-4):23 – 54.
Tom Regan (1997). The Rights of Humans and Other Animals. Ethics and Behavior 7 (2):103 – 111.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads193 ( #1,861 of 722,826 )
Recent downloads (6 months)8 ( #12,363 of 722,826 )
How can I increase my downloads?